Post-Quantum Cryptography Readiness

Post-quantum cryptography (PQC) migration is the process of finding every place an organization uses public-key cryptography — TLS, VPNs, code signing, digital identity, stored encrypted data — and replacing quantum-vulnerable algorithms such as RSA and elliptic-curve cryptography with NIST-standardized quantum-resistant algorithms like ML-KEM and ML-DSA. It is an inventory and engineering program, not a product purchase, and for most enterprises it takes years.

The threat already has a name: harvest now, decrypt later. Adversaries are recording encrypted traffic today to decrypt it once a cryptographically relevant quantum computer exists. If your data must stay confidential for ten years, the clock started before you read this page.

NIST finalized the first post-quantum standards — FIPS 203 (ML-KEM), FIPS 204 (ML-DSA), and FIPS 205 (SLH-DSA) — in August 2024. NIST's transition guidance deprecates RSA-2048 and comparable elliptic-curve cryptography after 2030 and disallows them after 2035. CNSA 2.0, the cryptography suite required for U.S. National Security Systems, expects new acquisitions to support quantum-resistant algorithms in the 2025-2027 window, with exclusive use required by 2033.

If you sell into government, defense, or regulated finance, those dates are procurement gates, not suggestions. Contracts signed in 2027 will ask what your cryptography roadmap says. "We are monitoring the situation" is not a roadmap.

A cryptographic inventory — sometimes called a cryptographic bill of materials, or CBOM — is a complete register of where an organization uses cryptography: algorithms, key lengths, protocols, libraries, certificates, and the systems and data each one protects. It is the mandatory first step of any post-quantum cryptography migration, because no organization can prioritize replacing cryptography it has not located.

Most organizations have never built one. Cryptography hides in firmware, third-party SaaS, hardware security modules, ten-year-old internal applications, and vendor contracts. We find it by reading configurations and code, not by sending questionnaires.

The entry point is a two-week crypto-inventory sprint: automated discovery across networks, endpoints, code, and certificates, validated by engineers, producing a scored CBOM. Every entry gets an exposure score — data lifetime, algorithm strength, system criticality, vendor dependency — so the register ranks itself.

From there, Design & Build (6-12 weeks per phase) executes a phased migration roadmap: quick wins first (TLS endpoints, certificate policy), then the hard problems (PKI redesign, code signing, embedded systems), with crypto-agility designed in so the next algorithm transition is a configuration change, not a rebuild. Vendors that cannot state their PQC plans get flagged in your risk register, and our technology strategy practice turns that into procurement language.

You leave with a validated cryptographic inventory, an exposure-scored risk register, a phased migration roadmap with dates and owners, and board-ready reporting that maps your position against the NIST and CNSA 2.0 timelines. All of it transfers. Full IP, clean exit, no proprietary tooling holding your data hostage.

A quantum readiness assessment matters most where data lives longest: government-grade institutions, financial services, healthcare, critical infrastructure, and any company whose products ship with embedded cryptography. The work also connects outward — signing and identity infrastructure overlaps our digital trust and identity practice, and PQC posture is becoming a standing item in our cybersecurity assessments. Start with the two-week sprint. It answers the only question that matters right now: where are we exposed, and what moves first.